Much as I love org-mode tables, I'd say the only axis where an org table is more feature rich is the formula support. Visidata is an amazing multitool for exploring tabular data that supports many data sources. From an ergonomic perspective, visidata wins.
You may think that's pedantic but it really isn't. Half-decent TUIs are much closer to GUIs than they are to CLIs because they're interactive and don't suffer from discoverability issues like most CLIs do. The only similarity they have with CLIs is that they both run in a terminal emulator.
"htop" is a TUI, "ps" is a CLI. They can both accomplish most of the same things but the user experience is completely different. With htop you're clicking on columns to sort the live-updating process list, while with "ps" you're reading the manual pages to find the right flags to sort the columns, wrapping it in a "watch" command to get it to update periodically, and piping into "head" to get the top N results (or looking for a ps flag to do the same).
Oh, that's interesting. Linux kernel hacking is the area where I have the best chance of contributing something. If I can get my m3 max bootstrapped to a blinking cursor then I'd be very happy to participate in kernel work.
> The C2PA information comprises a series of statements that cover areas such as asset creation, edit actions, capture device details, bindings to content and many other subjects. These statements, called assertions, make up the provenance of a given asset and represent a series of trust signals that can be used by a human to improve their view of trustworthiness concerning the asset. Assertions are wrapped up with additional information into a digitally signed entity called a claim.
The idea with zero knowledge proofs is that typically, photography metadata is stripped when it’s posted on Facebook. The proof would be a piece of metadata that COULD be safe to share in the SPECIFICS of what it proves. For example there is a circuit that can show that the photo was taken in the United States without leaking the specific location the photo was taken.
Presumably the authenticity scheme here is supposed to be, it answers it was taken on a real camera in a real place, without leaking any of the metadata. They are vague because probably that circuit (proving program and scheme) hasn’t been designed yet.
I also don’t know if it is possible to make useful assertions at all in such a scheme, since authenticity is a collection of facts (for example) and ZK is usually used to specifically make association of related facts harder.
C2PA has the problem that it has a ton of optional metadata support and no well-defined strict validation procedure, so it's trivial to make fake photos appear valid using currently available C2PA enabled software.
They absolutely must define a much stricter mode that actually means something, and distinguish it from what they have now (which is essentially prototype level in terms of security model)
I have been using Emacs for 35 years and I am still learning along the way. It has been the one constant across Solaris, Linux, Windows and macOS for all that time.
That's amazing! It would be very interesting to see what a config spanning 35 years looks like, and what your workflow is. If you could write a blog post about it, I'm sure others would appreciate it as well.
I suppose this goes for any Emacs user. There's so much we can learn and be inspired from by seeing how other people use it.
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