> To be fair the article doesn't critique using 1990s (or earlier) hardware/software. It's merely a clickbait headline.
The "1990s home computers" power was simply an illustration of Boeing just trying to do the minimum work to move forward. Other examples that, while not bad per se, seem to indicate shortcuts:
> If one of two sensors malfunctioned, the system could struggle to know which was right. Airbus addressed this potential problem on some of its planes by installing three or more such sensors.
> Most new Boeing jets have electronic systems that take pilots through their preflight checklists, ensuring they don’t skip a step and potentially miss a malfunctioning part. On the Max, pilots still complete those checklists manually in a book.
> A second electronic system found on other Boeing jets also alerts pilots to unusual or hazardous situations during flight and lays out recommended steps to resolve them. On 737s, a light typically indicates the problem and pilots have to flip through their paper manuals to find next steps. [...] Boeing decided against adding it to the Max because it could have prompted regulators to require new pilot training, according to two former Boeing employees involved in the decision.
All of these things still get the job done, but they seem to indicate that Boeing simply wanted to do one last turn of the crank with the 737 design to compete with the A320neo, and may have rushed thing too much.
The "1990s home computers" power was simply an illustration of Boeing just trying to do the minimum work to move forward. Other examples that, while not bad per se, seem to indicate shortcuts:
> If one of two sensors malfunctioned, the system could struggle to know which was right. Airbus addressed this potential problem on some of its planes by installing three or more such sensors.
> Most new Boeing jets have electronic systems that take pilots through their preflight checklists, ensuring they don’t skip a step and potentially miss a malfunctioning part. On the Max, pilots still complete those checklists manually in a book.
> A second electronic system found on other Boeing jets also alerts pilots to unusual or hazardous situations during flight and lays out recommended steps to resolve them. On 737s, a light typically indicates the problem and pilots have to flip through their paper manuals to find next steps. [...] Boeing decided against adding it to the Max because it could have prompted regulators to require new pilot training, according to two former Boeing employees involved in the decision.
All of these things still get the job done, but they seem to indicate that Boeing simply wanted to do one last turn of the crank with the 737 design to compete with the A320neo, and may have rushed thing too much.