Malware writers will just get free ids and sign their malware. Will all of these OSX devices be regularly polling Apple to get a list of revoked certs?
Yes, the first problem will be to create some malware from OS X first. You know, the biggest success so far had been that Mac Defender, that was:
Depending what you call malware - some people feel that an application which silently uploads your address book is functionally equivalent, and there have been plenty of these available on all platforms.
"I guess this would be useful to prevent malware being installed, but it's not going to be massively useful to remove already installed malware. Especially if that malware can interrupt the polling."
You mistakenly read that as if I wasn't talking about malware that exists today. No. There are two situations:
1.) revocation cert issued before malware installed
2.) malware installed before revocation cert issued
I was talking about situation 2 occurring in N years time. You can tell this by the way I wrote "Especially if that malware can interrupt the polling." Which of course, isn't a feature of any malware that exists today, because the polling method doesn't exist yet.
If malware on OSX is as small a problem as you're suggesting, why is Apple bothering with any of this? Is it to wrestle further control of the app eco-system on OSX? Or is it just security theatre? Or both? Something else?
The current app eco-system doesn't allow them to just switch off the ability for people to install arbitrary apps. They need to get themselves into a situation where the vast majority of apps are signed first. Then it will be a lot easier for them to require apps to be signed. For your own protection of course.
EDIT: After all, if developer IDs are so easy and free to get, and will make it easier for people to install your app. Why wouldn't you get it signed?
> If malware on OSX is as small a problem as you're suggesting, why is Apple bothering with any of this?
Presumably, in order to keep the problem small. If OS X grows in marketshare, it will become an increasingly attractive target for malware developers. If the default is that the majority of Apple users only run signed applications (this also means that the certificate wasn't revoked), then the number of possible "users" for your malware is greatly reduced, making OS X a much less attractive target platform for malware developers.
> After all, if developer IDs are so easy and free to get, and will make it easier for people to install your app. Why wouldn't you get it signed?
If you are a legitimate developer, then there's no reason not to (assuming it actually is free and easy, which isn't clear). As a malware developer, there's little point; as soon as the developer ID is being used for malware, Apple will revoke the corresponding certificate, and your malware won't run.
If malware on OSX is as small a problem as you're suggesting, why is Apple bothering with any of this? Is it to wrestle further control of the app eco-system on OSX? Or is it just security theatre? Or both? Something else?
I don't understand the question. Apple has been improving OS X security mechanisms in every OS X update. From "address space layout randomization" to the "first run warning". This is another step in the same direction.
Are you implying that Apple should only do something about OS X security AFTER malware on OS X get's to be a problem? Because, I'd rather they do it BEFORE.
And I fail to see how pro-actively making an OS more secure is "security theater".
Then it will be a lot easier for them to require apps to be signed. For your own protection of course.
Of course. I miss the irony here. Signed applications are touted by security experts as a highly successful security measure. Are you suggesting it is otherwise or are you just confusing the potential of misuse of that feature with that feature being meaningless?
* After all, if developer IDs are so easy and free to get, and will make it easier for people to install your app. Why wouldn't you get it signed?*
Yeah, why? Surely not for the $100 it takes.
SSL certificates cost money too, but I don't see anybody suggesting running your web app in plain HTTP is better, or that paid certificates hamper secure web application development.
For one, most Macs are updated very often, what with Software Update and Mac Store updates. So updating a black list of applications wouldn't be a problem.
Second, they cannot just get a certificate, because they will have to interact with Apple and the developer program. You know many malware writers that want to give their details away?
Third, even if they somehow get through the second caveat above, revocation would just be a step away.
I then asked a rhetorical question about why would they be doing this if not to defend against malware.
No, you said that if they don't do it to defend against ALREADY EXISTING malware then it's either a security theater or a mystery to you why they'd do it.
As if defending against POSSIBLE FUTURE malware is a "security theater" or a strange notion.
I didn't think I would have to point out that I'm not psychic, and that it was only an opinion/prediction. I will try to be more clear in future.
"Second, they cannot just get a certificate, because they will have to interact with Apple and the developer program. You know many malware writers that want to give their details away?"
Sorry. I forgot that identity theft was impossible, and not rampant and easy and used as a matter of course by malware authors.
The last three lines of your comment are complete nonsense. You have failed to parse and understand what I wrote.
The last three lines of your comment are complete nonsense. You have failed to parse and understand what I wrote.
Yeah, because it is so off base, right, you writing:
"If malware on OSX is as small a problem as you're suggesting, why is Apple bothering with any of this? Is it to wrestle further control of the app eco-system on OSX? Or is it just security theatre? Or both? Something else?"
And me translating the above as you saying that if they don't do it to defend against ALREADY EXISTING malware then it's either a security theater or a mystery to you why they'd do it.
I was attempting to prompt you into retracting your ridiculous statement about malware not being a problem. I wish I hadn't bothered now. I'll leave you to it.
I was attempting to prompt you into retracting your ridiculous statement about malware not being a problem.
Ridiculous how?
It's perfectly valid, as in: VERY VERY VERY VERY VERY FEW OS X users ever had problems with malware. Less that what would be statistical noise. On top of it, all the cases of OS X malware, had been trojans. So, 99.9999% got scratch free, despite not even running any antivirus or anything.
You thought I was talking about malware that exists today. I wasn't. That's why your response made no sense. I was talking about in the future, when malware is installed before revocation certificates are pushed out.
This is why it looked like you were the one that was ignoring the future likelihood of malware on OSX, not me.
Go back to your first comment in this thread, and look at my most recent response to it. Then read my original comment. The problem here is that you simply misunderstood my initial comment, and replied to something which I did not say.
Yes, the first problem will be to create some malware from OS X first. You know, the biggest success so far had been that Mac Defender, that was:
a) a trojan (you had to install it yourself)
and
b) only affected like 10 users