* Bills start as draft language. The draft is circulated so that organizations like ACLU can point out things like "this bill gives too much deference to content rightsholders". The bill's authors then say, "that's not at all the intent of the bill" and then fix the language. It is very weird to complain about this, since it's the system actually working in the public interest. So, sorry, you're going to have to keep reading the bill. Also: CISPA is tiny. You can read it inside of 5 minutes. It isn't PPACA, the bill Pelosi commented on.
* I don't think software vulnerabilities are the best or most likely example of information that will be shared from the USG to the private sector under CISPA, but to the extent it is, you can simply assume that a (say) OpenSSH bug disclosed under CISPA to (say) Facebook is going to be patched immediately. I am a vulnerability researcher; that's my profession. It is a near-consensus among vulnerability researchers that the sooner vulnerability data is published, the safer we all are. I find it difficult to be concerned that CISPA might get OpenSSL flaws published faster. If that happens, great.
* If organizations don't want to share vulnerability information with the USG, they don't have to. CISPA is entirely opt-in. Moreover: vulnerabilities are a bad example of information CISPA enables sharing for. Companies can already lawfully share vulnerabilities with the USG. There is a whole cottage industry of small companies that sell vulnerabilities to the intelligence services. To the extent that your concerns about CISPA involve trafficking in privacy-harming exploit code (a very legitimate concern in general), you are (respectfully) ill informed about the current state of cybersecurity regulation.
* The reason CISPA preempts existing privacy laws and provides protection from liability is because there are lots of different privacy regulations on the books that make it difficult for companies operating in certain verticals to share any data without expensive legal review. If you deal with classroom data, you've got FERPA. If you have driver records, you have DPPA. CISPA does not repeal DPPA or HIPAA or FERPA; instead, it simply says that as long as companies are dealing in good faith with attack data --- "cyber threat information", a term the bill goes to some lengths to define --- they can reasonably assume they won't get sued for violating HIPAA by sharing that attack data.
* Individuals are exempted as private entities to protect individual privacy. The intent of that definition as stated by the bill's authors was to prevent CISPA from being interpreted as a mechanism for ISPs and the USG to enter into agreements to track individual customers. See "Myths and Facts About CISPA" at the House Intelligence Committee page. So: you have that concern exactly backwards.
* I don't have any response to your concern that the USG should not be liable for negligence in publishing sensitive data. I see it as a good thing that the bill creates accountability for the handling of the data, and wish there was more accountability in the bill, not less.
There are other questions in your comment that I didn't address because I didn't understand them, sorry.
* Bills start as draft language. The draft is circulated so that organizations like ACLU can point out things like "this bill gives too much deference to content rightsholders". The bill's authors then say, "that's not at all the intent of the bill" and then fix the language. It is very weird to complain about this, since it's the system actually working in the public interest. So, sorry, you're going to have to keep reading the bill. Also: CISPA is tiny. You can read it inside of 5 minutes. It isn't PPACA, the bill Pelosi commented on.
* I don't think software vulnerabilities are the best or most likely example of information that will be shared from the USG to the private sector under CISPA, but to the extent it is, you can simply assume that a (say) OpenSSH bug disclosed under CISPA to (say) Facebook is going to be patched immediately. I am a vulnerability researcher; that's my profession. It is a near-consensus among vulnerability researchers that the sooner vulnerability data is published, the safer we all are. I find it difficult to be concerned that CISPA might get OpenSSL flaws published faster. If that happens, great.
* If organizations don't want to share vulnerability information with the USG, they don't have to. CISPA is entirely opt-in. Moreover: vulnerabilities are a bad example of information CISPA enables sharing for. Companies can already lawfully share vulnerabilities with the USG. There is a whole cottage industry of small companies that sell vulnerabilities to the intelligence services. To the extent that your concerns about CISPA involve trafficking in privacy-harming exploit code (a very legitimate concern in general), you are (respectfully) ill informed about the current state of cybersecurity regulation.
* The reason CISPA preempts existing privacy laws and provides protection from liability is because there are lots of different privacy regulations on the books that make it difficult for companies operating in certain verticals to share any data without expensive legal review. If you deal with classroom data, you've got FERPA. If you have driver records, you have DPPA. CISPA does not repeal DPPA or HIPAA or FERPA; instead, it simply says that as long as companies are dealing in good faith with attack data --- "cyber threat information", a term the bill goes to some lengths to define --- they can reasonably assume they won't get sued for violating HIPAA by sharing that attack data.
* Individuals are exempted as private entities to protect individual privacy. The intent of that definition as stated by the bill's authors was to prevent CISPA from being interpreted as a mechanism for ISPs and the USG to enter into agreements to track individual customers. See "Myths and Facts About CISPA" at the House Intelligence Committee page. So: you have that concern exactly backwards.
* I don't have any response to your concern that the USG should not be liable for negligence in publishing sensitive data. I see it as a good thing that the bill creates accountability for the handling of the data, and wish there was more accountability in the bill, not less.
There are other questions in your comment that I didn't address because I didn't understand them, sorry.